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Blomquist and Christensen (2005) argue that welfare is initially decreasing in the price of 
an excludable public good and that the case for a positive public good price is weak.  We 
argue that this result follows from their particular characterization of the public good and 
that a more reasonable characterization overturns their result.  Hence the policy case for a 
positive price on the public good is stronger than Blomquist and Christiansen suggest.  
We also provide a more flexible characterization of public goods that nests a wide variety 






optimal second-best taxation  
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I. Introduction 
  In a recent article Blomquist and Christiansen (2005) argue that a necessary 
condition to charge a price for an excludable public good in the presence of a non-linear 
income tax is that the marginal valuation of the public good be increasing in leisure.  
Furthermore, they argue that given this condition, welfare is initially non-increasing in 
the price of the public good (in fact decreasing before possibly increasing).  Thus if it is 
uncertain what the optimal second-best price of the public good is, they argue that it may 
be better to set a zero price than to set a low price in hopes of avoiding overshooting the 
optimal price. 
  We argue that this result follows from their particular characterization of the 
public good and that with another more reasonable assumption, the condition that the 
marginal valuation of the public good is increasing in leisure is both necessary and 
sufficient for a positive price for the excludable public good.  Hence the policy case for a 
positive price on the public good is stronger than Blomquist and Christiansen suggest. 
  In the next section, we discuss different ways to characterize excludable public 
good access and provide an interpretation for the different results between our model and 
that of Blomquist and Christiansen.  In the following section we set up and solve the 
model.  Section 4 provides an analysis of the Samuelson Condition in our model.  We 
conclude in Section 5 with some summary observations on the flexibility of our model to 
handle the various types of public goods that have been studied in the literature. 
II.  Modeling Excludable Public Goods 
  Blomquist and Christiansen (henceforth B&C) model the government as 
providing G units of an excludable public good to which individuals can obtain access by   
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paying a per unit price q.  Upon payment of qg they may consume g units of the public 
good with the constraint that  G g ≤ .  They motivate this characterization of excludable 
public goods with such examples as weather forecasts with g measuring the amount of 
information the consumer purchases up to the maximal amount available; an art gallery 
with g measuring the number of rooms visited and G the total number of rooms available; 
and TV broadcasting where g measures the number of channels purchased and G the total 
number available.   
  Implicit in B&C's model is the restriction that consumers can purchase the public 
good only once.  Alternatively we characterize excludable public goods as goods that can 
be consumed repeatedly thereby allowing the government to charge a fee per use of the 
public good.  An on-line web service could charge a fee each time an individual wished 
to access up-to-date weather information; an art gallery could charge an entrance fee per 
visit; and a TV network could offer on-demand movies.  This strikes us as a reasonable 
characterization of most excludable public goods (public parks, uncongested highways, 
museums, for example).  Our modeling framework also allows for variation in the 
consumption of the public good across consumers based on differences in preferences. 
  In addition, the capacity constraint plays a key role in their model in a way that 
may mischaracterize most public goods.  Excludable public goods can be charged on a 
per use basis or with all-or-nothing pricing (access pricing).  B&C's model appears to be 
an example of per-unit pricing since different consumers may pay different amounts for 
the public good (depending on demand).  But in fact, their model is better understood as a 
model of multiple public goods with access pricing once the capacity constraint is 
binding.   
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  To understand the importance of our distinctions, consider the following 
examples.  There are two drivers using a road.  One uses the entire road once per day; the 
other uses it twice each day.  In B&C's model, which (if either) of these drivers is 
rationed (presuming they'd drive further on a longer road)?  If they're both rationed, are 
they consuming the same amount of the public good?  Obviously not.   
  As another example, consider an art gallery with five sections.  I choose to view 
three of the five sections.  In B&C's model, I am not rationed.  But now the gallery owner 
spends money to improve all five sections.  The amount of the public good has gone up 
as has my utility since the sections I do visit have been improved.  But in B&C's model, 
an expansion of G only raises utility if consumers are rationed.  For this example, an 
increase in G in B&C's model is the addition of a sixth room on the art gallery.  They 
argue that consumers get no benefit from this sixth room if they only wish to visit three 
rooms.  Their pricing assumption really amounts to an offer of multiple public goods 
(where each room is a public good and accessible at price q).
1   
  In fact, all the examples that B&C offer to motivate their model can be viewed as 
bundles of multiple public goods.  Cable television service with ten channels can be 
viewed as a bundle of ten public goods.  The cable company could offer service on a per-
channel basis.
2  A weather forecast can be a bundle of multiple public goods.  One public 
good could be a basis service; a second with more detail.   
                                                 
1 Note too the strong assumption that consumers receive no benefit from the expansion of G that might 
arise from the option value arising their potential desire to visit the sixth gallery room in the future.  We do 
not pursue this idea further in this paper. 
 
2   In fact, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission recently proposed just this pricing 
scheme for satellite and cable television companies.  See Labaton (2005) for details.   
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  It may well be that B&C's modeling of public goods is appropriate in certain 
cases.  It is important to determine, however, if B&C's conclusion that there is at best a 
weak case to be made for charging for excludable public goods is robust to the modeling 
of the public good.  We turn to that question now. 
III.  Optimal Pricing of Excludable Public Goods 
  Following B&C, we assume that there are two types of consumers (high ability 
and low ability) and that the government utilizes a non-linear income tax to finance the 
public good.  Type i consumers obtain utility over a consumption good, ci, and the public 
good, gi, and leisure, Li.  They face a time endowment Z = Hi + Li where Hi is the number 
of hours worked.  Their income Yi = wiHi where wi is their wage rate  (w2 > w1).   The 
government observes Yi but not hours worked or the wage rate separately.  Also as in 
B&C, the government is decentralized in that the tax agency cannot share income 
information with the agency providing the public good.   
  We assume that the public good consumption by type i consumers is a function of 
the number of visits to (or utilizations of) the public good, vi, and the amount of the 
public good provided, G: 
(1)  gi = f(vi, G) 
where the function f has the following properties: 
(2a)  f(0, G) = f(v, 0) = 0 
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The last condition means that the marginal consumption value of access to the public 
good increases with the amount of the public good provided.  Without loss of generality, 
we make the further assumption that public good consumption is linear in visits (or 
utilization).
3  With that assumption, the function f(vi, G) takes the form vih(G) with h'(v) 
> 0 and h(0) = 0.  One simple characterization of public good consumption is gi = viG.   
  Thus individuals of type i maximize the utility function 
(3)  U
i(ci, gi, Hi) 
subject to the budget constraint 
(4)  ci + pv·vi = wi Hi - Ti = Yi - Ti(Yi) = Bi 
where pv is the price per usage for the public good, Ti(Yi) is a non-linear income tax and -
Bi is after-tax income.  We model the price per usage of the public good as comprising a 
private cost (normalized at 1) and a public charge ( v p ~ ).  The government sets and 
receives  v p ~  per visit with  0 ~ ≥ v p .  Thus   1 ~ + = v v p p .  In the absence of a private cost of 
utilizing the public good, we would observe that consumers make infinite use of the 
public good if the price were set to zero.  Since we don't observe this in public parks and 
other excludable public goods with zero entrance fees, this seems a reasonable 
assumption. It costs money and/or time to utilize a public good and we simply want to 
capture this opportunity cost in our model.  The government can choose pv or  v p ~  as its 
choice variable in its optimization problem described below. 
  It will be convenient to define the price of the public good, pg  
                                                 
3   This does not imply that utility is linear in visits.     




















= = =  
The price of g rises with pv and falls with G.   While the government's public good 
instruments are  v p ~  and G, we can equivalently characterize them in terms of  g p ~  and G.
4  
Lastly, we will find it convenient to work with the utility function in terms of 
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  The government sets a non-linear income tax for the two types of individuals 
(with Ni of each type) in a pareto efficient fashion to raise revenue to help pay for the 
public good.   Specifically, we assume the planner maximizes: 
(6) 
G p Y B Y g , ~ , , , , B 2 2 1 1
Max V1(B1, Y1,  g p ~ ,G )       
subject to 
(7)   V2(B2, Y2,  g p ~ ,G) ≥ V
__
2      
(8)  V2(B2, Y2,  g p ~ ,G) ≥  2 V ˆ (B1, Y1,  g p ~ ,G)      
(9) N2(Y2-B2) + N1(Y1-B1) +  g p ~ (N1·g1 + N2·g2) – mG ≥ 0    
where m is the marginal cost of producing the public good and 
2 ˆ V  refers to the utility of 
a high-ability type mimicking a low-ability type. 
The Lagrangian and first order conditions for this problem are 
(10)     Λ = V1(B1, Y1,  g p ~ ,G) + β[V2(B2, Y2,  g p ~ ,G) - V
__
2]  +  
                                        ρ[V2(B2, Y2,  g p ~ ,G) -  2 V ˆ (B1, Y1,  g p ~ ,G)] +  
                                                 
4   Following B&C, we assume that  v p ~ and  g p ~  are non-negative.   
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g p ~ ∂
Λ ∂





[ 2 g ˆ  – g1]  +  ∑ gg
i
g S p ~   µ  ≤ 0, 
where S
i
gg  < 0 is the i
th individual’s own-price Slutsky term.  As B&C note, the first term 
captures the social benefit from relaxing (or the social cost from tightening) the self-
                                                 
5  Details are in Appendix.   
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selection constraint while the second term describes the distortionary effect due to the 
wedge between the price of the public good (pg) and the marginal cost of access (0).   
Note that, from equation (15’), if the optimal price is positive, it is given by the formula  

















The analysis done so far is analogous to that of Blomquist and Christiansen.   Let us now 
consider the demand for the public good for the type 1 consumer relative to the 
mimicking type 2 consumer.  Blomquist and Christiansen's Proposition 2 rules out the 
possibility of a positive price in the case that  1 2 ˆ g g ≤ .  This also follows directly from 
inspection of equation (16').   
 Their  result  that 1 2 ˆ g g >  is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a positive 
price on the public good depends crucially on their modeling assumption for the public 
good.  Once we replace rationing with our assumptions embodied in equations (1) and 
(2), we can show 
Proposition 1.  The condition that  1 2 ˆ g g >  is a sufficient condition for a positive price on 
the excludable public good to be pareto improving from an initial position with  g p ~ equal 
to zero. 





g p g p





[ 2 g ˆ  – g1] > 0.   QED   
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  The intuition for why  1 2 ˆ g g >  is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
positive price on the excludable public good to be pareto improving is straightforward.  






[ 2 g ˆ  – g1]  +  ∑ gg
i
g S p ~   µ  = 0 
Consider a small increase in the price for the public good, dp > 0 with a revenue neutral 
decrease in the income tax dTi = -gidp.  Utility for both consumer types will be 
unchanged since dVi = -ViB(dTi + gidp) = 0 by Roy's Identity.  The utility for the 
mimicking consumer is  ( ) ( ) . 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 2 2 2 1 2 2 < − − = + − = dp g g V dp g dT V V d B B   This reform 
makes mimicking less attractive and allows a relaxation of the self-selection constraint 
thereby allowing a reduction of the distortion on type 1 consumers required to ensure a 
separating equilibrium.
6 
  Summing up, the condition  1 2 ˆ g g >  is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
positive price on the public good.  B&C's conclusion that "[t]he policy case for a price 
may thus appear rather weak" (p. 61) depends on utility initially being unchanged over 
some interval of q from {0, q }, then falling starting at price q , and then eventually 
rising to the socially optimal q. With our characterization of excludable public goods, we 
find that utility unambiguously increases as the price is increased starting at zero.  We 
thus find a stronger policy case to be made for pricing excludable public goods. 
 When  will 1 2 ˆ g g = ?  If utility is weakly separable between the consumption good 
and the public good on the one hand and leisure on the other hand, public good 
                                                 
6  This is analogous to the intuition for commodity taxation and self-selection provided in Edwards et al. 
(1994).  That paper investigates the interplay between commodity taxation, non-linear income taxation and 
the provision of a non-excludable public good.   
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consumption of type 1 consumers and mimicking type 2 consumers are identical.  This 
follows since differences in the consumption of type 1 consumers and mimicking type 2 
consumers result only from difference in labor supply, which does not affect the desired 
consumption of the public good with this form of weakly separable utility.  In that case, 
the optimal price for the public good is zero.
7  This emphasizes the importance of labor 
distortions in the optimal pricing of the public good.   
  We next turn to the appropriate characterization of the Samuelson Condition in 
this second-best framework.  As has been noted in other models of public goods in 
second-best frameworks (Atkinson and Stern (1974), King (1986), Boadway and Keen 
(1993), and Edwards, et al. (1994) among others) the rule must be modified to the extent 
that leisure and the public good are related.  We make this relationship more precise in 
the next section. 
 
IV.  The Samuelson Condition Revisited 
 
  The analysis in the previous section shows that introducing pg as the price of the 
public good allows us to draw on the literature on optimal commodity taxation with a 
non-linear income tax (e.g. Christiansen (1984), Edwards, et al. (1994)).  Analogous to 
Edwards, et al.'s Proposition 3 is  
Proposition 2.  Pareto efficiency in the provision of the public good, G, in the presence 
of self-selection constraints requires 








·[ 1 2 MRS MRS −
∧








proof:  see appendix. 
                                                 
7   Edwards et al. (1994) find an analogous result for non-excludable public goods.   
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The Samuelson condition that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution should equal 
the marginal rate of transformation is altered in two ways.  First, there is a term that 
depends on the desire to deter mimicking by high-ability types.  And second, there is a 
revenue term.  Focusing on this latter term first, the marginal cost of the public good is 
lowered to the extent that increased provision of the public good increases utilization and 
therefore entry fee revenue.  The modification of the Samuelson condition for revenue 
effects of increased public good provision is well known (see Atkinson and Stern (1974) 
for example).   
  The term including the difference in the MRS between the mimicking and low-
ability consumer reflects the benefits arising from the public good's ability to help 
distinguish between high and low-ability consumers.  To see why this is so, let's assume 
that visits (v) are unaffected by changes in the amount of the public good (G) so we can 
ignore the third term in (19).  Further assume that  1 2 MRS MRS −
∧
 > 0.  Then ∑MRSi > m 
at the second-best optimum.  If ∑MRSi was monotonically decreasing in G, then 
applying the Samuelson condition would lead to an overprovision of the public good.
8  
Consider an initial provision of G where the Samuelson condition holds and decrease G 
marginally.  At the same time, lower the high ability type's taxes by MRS2 and the low-
ability type's taxes by MRS1.  Utility for both types will be unchanged and the 
government's budget remains balanced.  But the mimicker has a loss of utility since the 
value of the loss of the public good ( 2
∧
MRS ) exceeds the gain from lower taxes (MRS1).  
This makes mimicking less attractive and allows for a relaxation of the self-selection 
                                                 
8 Atkinson and Stern (1974) note that there may not be a monotone relationship between the aggregate MRS 
and G.  We will assume it here to develop intuition.   
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constraint which in turn allows for a increase in utility for the low-ability types without 
adversely affecting the high-ability types.
9 
  As Boadway and Keen (1993) point out in the context of non-excludable public 








·[ 1 2 MRS MRS −
∧
] in equation (19) equals zero if utility is weakly 
separable between the consumption good and the public good on the one hand and leisure 
on the other hand.  Since the only difference between a mimicking high-ability consumer 
and a low-ability consumer is their labor supply, the MRS for both must be the same since 
weak separability of this kind implies that the MRS between the private and the public 
good is independent of labor supply.  And as discussed in the last section, weak 
separability also implies the planner should not charge a positive price for public good 
usage so that both the second term and the third term vanish with this weak separability. 
We formalize this result as  
Proposition 3.  If utility for both types of consumers is of the form  () () i i i i
i H g c F U , ,,  
then the Samuelson condition holds: 
(20)  ∑MRSi = m. 
  In closing we note that an appealing feature of our model is its general 
applicability to non-excludable as well as excludable public goods.  Public goods differ in 
two key aspects: first, they may be excludable or non-excludable and second, it may be 
possible to consume varying amounts of the public good.  Thus there are four possible 
types of public goods. 
                                                 
9    Boadway and Keen (1993) use this same intuition in the case of a non-excludable public good with no 
entry fee.   
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We next give specific examples for each category and consider how our model 
nests this category.  Recall that in our model individual maximization problem
10 is 
() i v i i
i
i
i i g c v p c B
w
Y






λ , , max
,
 and the optimal provision rule is given by equation 
(19) repeated here for convenience: 
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∧








We shall show how this equation is modified for the different types of public goods. 
In the first case, the public good is non-excludable and consumption levels fixed.  
This is the classic public good first studied by Samuleson (1954) and analyzed by 
Boadway and Keen (1993) in the presence of a non-linear income tax; national defense is 
an oft-cited example of such a good.  In the context of our model, we normalize the usage 
level (vi) for every citizen at 1 so that public good consumption for every consumer is 
G G vi = .  Because the good is non-excludable, the provider cannot charge a per-use 
price for consuming the public good so  v p ~ = 0.  Thus the policy instruments available to 
the social planner are B1, B2, Y1, Y2 and G just as in Boadway and Keen and the optimal 
provision rule becomes  








·[ 1 2 MRS MRS −
∧
]   
Note that this modified rule is the same as equation (9) in Boadway and Keen (1993).  
  Next is the case of an excludable public good with uniform consumption levels 
across consumers (conditional on consuming the public good).  Fraser (1996) is a good 
example of such a model.  While our model is not precisely analogous to that of Fraser, it 
                                                 
10 Without loss of generality, we assume h(G) = G.   
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is easily modified by allowing the low-ability types (for example) to opt out of 
consumption of the public good and only tax the high-ability types to finance the public 
good.  The term  1 2 MRS MRS −
∧
 in equation (19') reflecting the distortion arising from the 
self-selection constraint is analogous to the term in Fraser's equation (5) measuring the 
change in the marginal consumer of the public good due to a change in the tax level used 
to finance its production.  As argued above, we feel that the Blomquist and Christiansen 
model falls in this category in the case where their capacity constraint binds. 
  The third case allows for varying levels of consumption.  As we've argued in this 
paper, many public goods can be consumed in differing amounts based on the amount of 
access.  In this case, we allow for endogenous consumption of a non-excludable public 
good.  An example of such a good may be my enjoyment of a neighbor's beautiful home 
as I walk by it on my way to work.
11  In our model, every consumer is assumed to have 
the same access to the public good and to consume the same amount of the public good. 
We can model non-excludability by simply constraining pv to zero and each consumer 
type consumes a fixed amount of the public good.
12 
Finally, the last case is an excludable public good with endogenous consumption, 
the case we focus most attention on in this paper.  We are not aware of other papers that 
analyze this case.  We do note an historic example of such a public good from Coase 
(1974) –  that of British lighthouses.  According to Coase, ships using the lighthouse paid 
fees that were "so much per net ton payable per voyage for all vessels arriving at, or 
                                                 
11 Excludability is clearly a technological phenomenon.  My neighbor could presumably build a sufficiently 
tall fence so as to exclude me from viewing the house.  This good is non-excludable if the cost of doing so 
is prohibitive. 
12 Equation (19) is again the same as Boadway and Keen's equation (9) with one minor difference: the 
consumption of the ability types may differ in our model.  But this is observationally equivalent to the 
situation where both types consume the same amount of G but their marginal utility of public good 
consumption differs.    
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departing from, ports in Britain" (p. 361).  Because only ships would come near the 
British lighthouses if they planned to enter or leave British ports, it was possible to levy a 
usage charge.  Presumably if ships evaded the payment, they would be barred from future 
entry into (or exit from) these ports, thereby denying them the use of the public good.
13 
Summing up, we feel that our characterization of the public good benefits in 
utility deriving from the amount of the public good provided (G) as well as usage (v) 
provides a flexible framework for thinking about a wide range of public good models. 
V. Conclusion 
  We have argued that Blomquist and Christiansen's result that utility decreases in 
entry price for an excludable public good before (possibly) increasing depends 
importantly on their characterization of the public good.  With a more natural 
characterization of excludable public goods, we find that utility rises if an incremental 
entry fee is applied to a public good (starting from zero) so long as utility is not weakly 
separable between private and public good consumption on the one hand and leisure on 
the other.  We find, therefore, that their conclusion that there is at best a weak case to be 
made for charging for excludable public goods is not robust to the modeling of the public 
good.  Hence the policy case for a positive price on the public good is stronger than 
Blomquist and Christiansen suggest. 
  We also characterize the modified Samuelson condition for the provision of an 
excludable public good with entry fee and find that the original Samuelson condition 
must be modified for an entry fee revenue impact as well as a distortion term arising from 
the desire to distinguish high-ability from low-ability consumers. 
                                                 
13 There is the slight complication in that the fees were capped at a given level of voyages (depending on 
whether the ship was a "Home Trade" or "Foreign-going" ship).  But this complication should not distract 
from the point that a non-excludable public good with endogenous access exists.   
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  Another contribution of this note is a more flexible characterization of public 
good consumption by allowing for varying use by different consumers, a particularly 
important issue in the context of excludable public goods where an entry fee is charged.  
Our model is general enough to subsume the non-excludable public good case by simply 
setting the access fee to zero.  Thus our model allows us to bring together a number of 
results from different papers in the literature on public good provision all under the 
umbrella of a single model.   
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Appendix 
1.  Derivation of equation (15’) from equation (15) 
  First, we verify Roy’s identity: 














From Vi(Bi, Yi,  g p ~ , G) = Vi
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By the same logic, when G is being fixed,  
















  Using the Slutsky equation for g, that is, 































equation (15) becomes: 
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(A6)  
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,  (A6) becomes: 
(A6’) 
z p ~ ∂
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2
gg )]. 
The last equality follows directly from applying FOC conditions (11) and (13) to the 
equation. 
Therefore, 
z p ~ ∂
Λ ∂









 +  ∑ gg
i
g S p ~   µ      QED. 
 
2.  Proof of Proposition 2 
  First, let us define indirect utility alternatively as Vi(Bi, Yi,  v p ~ , G)
14 and MRS as: 
                                                 
14 Unlike in section 3 where we used the effective public good price ( g p ~ ), we use v p ~  to prove proposition 
2. 
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  Second, let us verify the Slutsky equation for v (visits) with change in G. Consider 
the identity  
(A8)       ) , , ( G p u v v i
c
i  =  ) , ), , , , ( ( G p u w G p e v v i i v i i .  
Taking derivatives with respect to G, we get  




























describes changes in how much after tax income is needed to keep utility 
remaining same when G gets higher, that is,  
















the equation (A9) becomes: 






































  Now, social welfare maximization problem with this indirect utility function is: 
(A11)     Λ = V1(B1, Y1,  v p ~ , G) + β[V2(B2, Y2,  v p ~ , G) – ) 2 V ]  + ρ[V2(B2, Y2,  v p ~ , G)  
  –  2 ˆ V (B1, Y1,  v p ~ , G)] + µ[N2(Y2 –B2) + N1(Y1 –B1) +  v p ~ (N1·v1 + N2·v2) – mG] 
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The last equality follows directly from applying FOC conditions (11) and (13). 
 
  By dividing equation (A16’) by µ and rearranging, we get: 
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The last equality follows from applying Slutsky equation for v. 
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    QED. 
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